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Articles
If I Had a Rocket Launcher: Critical
Legal Studies as Moral Terrorism
by DAVID FRASER*
Prologue
There is a story, perhaps apocryphal, about an organizing meeting
that took place in San Francisco during the heyday of protests against
the war in Vietnam. The meeting started early in the morning and con-
tinued without a break into the wee hours of the next day During the
discussion, every option for future tactics and strategies was raised, from
passive resistance to the possibility of more aggressive, perhaps more bla-
tantly illegal, activities. As the encounter was winding down, the secre-
tary gave the following summary of the conclusions and plans to be
drawn from the day's debates:
If we do an action, that's right on; if we don't do an action, that's right
on too.
For anyone who has attended a Critical Legal Studies (CLS) annual
meeting or summer camp, this is an accurate reflection of those events as
well, although perhaps CLS lunch breaks are longer. Indeed, one of my
fondest memories is of the scene at the CLS Summer Camp of 1987,
where Duncan wandered around Alan and Betty's cabin asking everyone
present, "What's the plan? Do we have a plan?" This paper argues that
those of us who may somehow be identified as Crits must opt to "do an
action"; that is our plan.1
* David Fraser teaches law at the University of Sydney. This is for Julie, moral terror-
ist par excellence and cause of much tribulation.
1. Duncan is Duncan Kennedy, Harvard Law School Professor; Alan and Betty are
Alan Freeman and Betty Mensch of the State University of New York, Faculty of Law. Each
in his or her own way is a CLS "heavy." For an account of the importance of venue to the
inside life of CLS, see Keller, The Phenomenology of Critical Legal Drinking and the Reifica-
tion of Alan and Betty's Room, NEWSLETTER OF THE CONFERENCE ON CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES, May 1987, at 12.
Introduction
Send lawyers, guns and money. The shit has hit the fan.
-Warren Zevon
A few years ago, I wrote an article in which I called for members of
CLS to commit acts of moral terrorism.2 While I would not pretend that
this call to action has had any effect on CLS types, it has, at a very
micro-level, proved its veracity. In other words, it really has bothered
the liberals. Tenure and promotion committees and hiring panels have
invoked it and interrogated me as to whether I "really meant it."
That particular act of moral terrorism, calling upon others to com-
mit acts of moral terrorism, points to the strengths and weaknesses of
such a strategy. It has had little more effect than making my academic
life slightly uncomfortable. Therefore, one might well question the mili-
tary efficiency of such a strategy. On the other hand, it has bothered at
least some of those people I see as my opponents in the struggle for intel-
lectual hegemony in legal education. It is a law review article, a piece of
writing that is, by its very appearance in such a forum, normalized, dif-
fused. A law review article is hardly a car bomb, leaving violence and
destruction in its wake, but it is one of the few forms of "armed propa-
ganda" open to those of us who believe in a fundamentally different
world and who live and work in the heart of the legal academy. In a very
real sense, legal scholarship, as an act of "interpretation," is an act of
calculated and relentless violence. It is an imposition of meaning, a will
to power in a world of the word. As Robert Cover says:
Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death. This is
true in several senses. Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the
imposition of violence upon others: A judge articulates her under-
standing of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his
2. Fraser, Truth and Hierarchy: Will the Circle Be Unbroken?, 33 BUFFALO L. REV.
729 (1984). I said:
Moral terrorism seeks to avoid reform at all costs. For example, in the acad-
emy, rather than encouraging our students and colleagues to engage in left-wing
study groups, where they can escape from the mysteries of trespass on the case to the
inherent clarity of Derrida's Of Grammatology, we should encourage them to learn a
socially useful trade-playing the piano, for example-and to abandon law school
forever. We can disrupt faculty meetings with various acts of civil or, preferably,
uncivil disobedience. We can engage in subversion by memorandum. The possibili-
ties are limited only by the available concepts of the absurd.
Several objections could be raised against this version of moral terrorism; espe-
cially that it is juvenile. This is true. It is juvenile. The very point of moral terror-
ism is to permit us to recapture the halcyon days of our youth, when freedom was an
unquestioned component of our daily existence. A perpetuation of childhood or ado-
lescence can have a highly liberating effect. Besides, it really bothers the liberals.
Id. at 773 n.156.
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property, his children, even his life. Interpretations in law also consti-
tute justifications for violence which has already occurred or which is
about to occur. When interpreters have finished their work, they fre-
quently leave behind victims whose lives have been torn apart by these
organized, social practices of violence. Neither legal interpretation nor
the violence it occasions may be properly understood apart from one
another. This much is obvious, though the growing literature that ar-
gues for the centrality of interpretive practices in law blithely ignores
it.3
I shall return to a discussion of the military and political efficacy of
such acts of armed propaganda by Crits, but first I shall address some of
the critiques of moral terrorism and some of the reasons I believe such
acts are the only politically justifiable mode of existence for the self-pro-
fessed left in the legal academy.
The primary objection to moral terrorism is that raised by Duncan
Kennedy. Duncan argues, in his typically persuasive manner, that what
I might call moral terrorism and seek to legitimize with political theory,
is really nothing more than "macho self-immolation."'4 There are, I
think, two prongs to Duncan's attack. The first is a question of strategic
feasibility, to which I shall return below. The second is a more personal,
psychological point: that my theory and practice of moral terrorism5 are
indicative of a complex penchant for self-destruction. I do not deny the
accuracy of Duncan's evaluation of my own psychoses and neuroses.
Yet I do dispute the accuracy of his assessment of moral terrorism as a
form of political praxis.
It is quite common in today's discussions of terrorism to revert to
psychoanalytic critiques of the "terrorist mentality." Thus, terrorists
3. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
4. Personal communication with Duncan Kennedy; Buffalo, New York, March, 1987,
Seminar on Legal Education, State University of New York, Faculty of Law and Jurispru-
dence lecture. This appears to be a more personalized version of Duncan's gradualist ap-
proach expounded elsewhere. Thus, he states:
Let me hasten to affirm, 0 Reader, that not all resistance is equally heroic, or equally
successful, or equally well-conceived, or equally adapted to an overall strategy for
turning resistance into something more. I propose in the next chapter that law stu-
dents and teachers should take relatively minor professional risks.
D. KENNEDY, EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST
THE SYSTEM 99 (1973).
5. For other examples of my attempts at armed propaganda, see Fraser, The Day the
Music Died: The Civil Law Tradition from a Critical Legal Studies Perspective, 32 LoY. L.
REV. 861, 876, 888-92 (1987) [hereinafter The Day the Music Died] (calling for a "country and
western Critical Legal Studies" and arguing that judging is "a form of mental illness"); Fraser,
What's Love Got To Do With It? Critical Legal Studies, Feminist Discourse, and The Ethic of
Solidarity, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 53, 80 (1988) [hereinafter What's Love Got to Do With It?]
(describing the castration fears of male law professors and the joys of sleeping with our female
students. Id. at 75-77).
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may be isolated individuals who seek emotional strength and reinforce-
ment through the group dynamic of the "collectivization of loneliness"; 6
or German women join "terrorist" groups such as the Rote Armee Frak-
tion (Red Army Fraction-RAF) because conditions of "anomie" and
patriarchal family and social structures in post-war Germany repress
"normal" modes of political expression in their warped psyches; 7 or
Horst Mahler, co-founder of the RAF, became a terrorist, in part at
least, because of a stem, autocratic father who symbolized all that was
wrong with the German state;8 or failures of "primary socialization"
may lead a deformed personality to seek "an identity" in a "terrorist"
group;9 or simple frustration-aggression may cause terrorism.10
Thus, any number of psychoanalytic theories and explanations have
been trotted out to explain away terrorism as a form of individual devi-
ance. Yet no one, even the proponents of these theories, I' believes that
all "terrorists" and all acts of "terrorism" are simply examples of
blocked libidos or unresolved Oedipal conflicts. Indeed, studies of some
"terrorist" groups show their members to be unnervingly "normal."' 12
6. Merkl, Conclusion: Collective Purposes and Individual Motives, in POLITICAL VIO-
LENCE AND TERROR: MOTIFS AND MOTIVATIONS 335, 368 (P. Merkl ed. 1986) [hereinafter
POLITICAL VIOLENCE].
7. Falk, Terror as Politics: The German Case, 20 INT'L REV. HIST. & POL. Sci. 22
(1983). According to Falk, "Therefore it is not unreasonable for women to now seize the gun,
or other 'equalizers' so as to provide them finally with that modicum of power which is always
produced by the infliction of terror however fleeting, however temporary." Id. at 29 (footnote
omitted).
8. Billig, The Lawyer Terrorist and His Comrades, 6 POL. PSYCHOLOGY 29, 30 (1985).
9. Wasmund, The Political Socialization of Terrorist Groups in West Germany, 11 J.
POL. & MILITARY Soc. 223, 229-32 (1983).
10. Ferracuti, A Sociopsychiatric Interpretation of Terrorism, 463 ANNALS 129, 132-33
(1982).
11. See supra notes 8-10.
12. See Clark, Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members, in POLITICAL VIOLENCE, supra
note 7, at 283. In his study of members of the Basque liberation movement Euzkadi ta As-
katasuna (ETA), Clark found that
etarras are well within the range of functioning and sane human beings; whereas
terrorists in general may be seriously distressed, members of ETA suffer from no
greater levels of stress than are observed across Basque society generally, and cer-
tainly their stress level does not exceed the bounds of what is manageable by normal,
functioning men and women; and whereas insurgents in general may have difficulty
in establishing and maintaining warm and nurtural interpersonal relationships, etar-
ras have relationships with loved ones that are normal to the point of being mundane.
Indeed, one of the sources of ETA's great durability over the past two decades has no
doubt been the ability of etarras to seek refuge and solace (as well as material sup-
port) from among those whom they love and cherish. Etarras are not alienated per-
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While it may be true that psycho-existential weirdness pervades my life13
and the lives of other Crits, 14 this cannot serve as a pre-emptory chal-
lenge to the theory and praxis of moral terrorism.
On the other hand, it must be noted, if further reference is required,
that a "New McCarthyism"' 5 pervades many American law schools and
their attitudes towards Critical Legal Studies. Crits are denied tenure,
fired, not hired, and generally made miserable and forced to keep quiet,
be respectable, or be screwed. A clear-cut and vicious anti-terrorist cam-
paign 16 is being raged at law schools against Crits. Whether Crits are or
are not engaged in guerrilla warfare or acts of terrorism, they are being
so labelled and tactics of repression are being used against them. The
question of available responses to these actions is now clearly on the CLS
table. Will we resort to the "rights talk" we so vehemently criticize and
trash in the pages of law reviews or will we counter terror with terror?' 7
Is there a middle ground? In the next sections of this paper I will at-
tempt to propose my own response to these now very practical questions.
I. On Critical Legal Studies as Guerrilla Warfare
This ain't no party
This ain't no disco
This ain't no fooling around
-Talking Heads
The powerful tool of lawyers is language; it is what we are really
good at. Opponents of CLS are very good at using language to create
images, both conscious and unconscious, that will strike fear and loath-
ing into the hearts of the consumers of legal writings and popular litera-
ture about law. One of the most powerful pieces of imagination invoked
as part of these counter-terrorist tactics is the symbolic invocation (as
13. See Fraser, What's Love Got to Do With It?, supra note 5, at 70-77.
14. See Kennedy, Psycho-Social CLS. A Comment on the Cardozo Symposium, 6 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1013 (1985).
15. See Frug, McCarthyism and Critical Legal Studies, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 665
(1987); see also NEWSLETTER OF THE CONFERENCE ON CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, July 1988
(detailing the rise of oppression against Crits and other minorities in the academy). For the
first salvo of repression see Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227
(1984). For other examples of "state terror" and "Crit-bashing" see Frug, supra, at 676.
16. For a clear exposition of the nature of so-called counter-terrorist strategies and the
key role played by rule of law ideology therein, see Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Liberal De-
mocracy: The Problems of Response, in THE NEW TERRORISM (Gutteridge ed. 1986).
17. I have offered a brief polemical critique of the inadequate CLS response in Fraser, A
Touch of Gray: Critical Legal Studies and the New McCarthyism, I MACQUARIE L. STU-
DENTS' J. 44 (1989). I think Billy Bragg offers the politically correct response when he states:
"If you've got a blacklist, I want to be on it." Workers Playtime, "Waiting for the Great Leap
Forwards" (1988).
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reality) of the CLS adherent engaging in guerrilla warfare.18 Somehow,
we are supposed to envisage Duncan in black pajamas stalking through
the rice paddies of Cambridge or teachers in berets educating the peas-
ants in the mountains of Palo Alto.
Recently, a proponent or sympathizer of CLS has attempted to
regain the rhetorical terrain through the tactic of a lightning strike law
review article. 19 Unfortunately, both pro- and anti-CLS invocations of
the "guerrilla" are largely misplaced and display a shockingly uncritical
ignorance of the theory and practice of guerilla warfare in general, and
more particularly of how CLS might (or more probably might not), be
seen as embodying the "war of the flea." '20
The misapprehensions under which those who invoke the language
of the rice paddy labor are two-fold; the first is theoretical ambiguity, the
second tactical and strategic fallacy. The theoretical ambiguity suffered
by those who wish to characterize CLS as guerilla warfare is that they
are missing a step in their rhetorical development. They have failed to
fill in a huge piece of the canvas so that their beautiful imagery has a
gaping hole. The analogy they wish their readers to make is this: guer-
rilla warfare = evil. This equation, however, ignores the weight of the
countervailing heroic imagery of the underdog, a dominant theme in the
popular imagination of the United States.21 More importantly, it ignores
the facts of historical reality. As Pomeroy states: "[A]ll classes in society
at one time or another have organized, participated in or supported gue-
rilla struggles." '22
Despite efforts to the contrary, the notion of the "guerrilla" is still
capable of calling up images of American heroes like the Green Moun-
18. For a list of the sources of these instances of linguistic terror from the right, see Frug,
supra note 15, at 679 n.15.
19. See Binder, On Critical Legal Studies As Guerrilla Warfare, 76 GEO. L.J. I (1987).
20. See R. TABER, THE WAR OF THE FLEA: A STUDY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE THE-
ORY AND PRACTICE (1970). He describes guerrilla warfare as follows:
Analogically, the guerrilla fights the war of the flea, and his military enemy suffers
the dog's disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an
enemy to come to grips with. If the war continues long enough-this is the theory-
the dog succumbs to exhaustion and anemia without even having found anything on
which to close his jaws or to rake with his claws.
Id. at 29.
21. Such counterimagery does not yet exist as far as "terrorism" is concerned. Therefore
to accuse one's opponents of being "terrorists" invokes images of dark-skinned men, with
heavy stubble, committing acts intended to dismember innocent women and children. The
rhetorical effectiveness, the semiotic weight of the "terrorist" label, is a result of provoking a
desire to protect the weak (women, children) against the evil (the racist image of the "Arab"
terrorist), thereby relying on many of the dominant patriarchal mythologies of white America.
22. W. J. POMEROY, GUERRILLA WARFARE AND MARXISM 10 (Pomeroy ed. 1970).
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tain Boys, Davey Crockett, Buffalo Bill, the Rangers, the Green Berets or
even the revolting images of Contras as Freedom Fighters. The semiotic
equation that guerrilla warfare = evil is not as firmly rooted in the popu-
lar imagination as Crit-bashers would hope.
But it is the second fallacy, the tactical and strategic fallacy, that is
more troubling for those of us who believe that Critical Legal Studies
should play a role in the transformation of our society. A brief expose of
the theories and practices of guerrilla warfare will indicate why the use of
guerrilla warfare imagery to describe the CLS project is problematic.
The first difficulty that arises when one speaks of CLS as guerrilla
warfare (putting aside questions of which CLS) is which guerrilla warfare
are we discussing? Here the CLS contingency critique of law can be
turned into a contingency critique of guerrilla struggle. Thus as Regis
Debray clearly recognized, each form and forum of struggle must be
carefully analyzed according to its own peculiar and particular circum-
stances. Each national liberation struggle must both learn the lessons of
histories and adapt the lessons to the specific conditions of its own, in-
dependent battle.
But once again in Latin America, militants are reading Fidel's
speeches and Che Guevara's writings with eyes that have already read
Mao on the anti-Japanese war, Giap, and certain texts of Lenin-and
they think they recognize the latter in the former. Classical visual su-
perimposition, but dangerous, since the Latin American revolutionary
war possesses highly special and profoundly distinct conditions of de-
velopment, which can only be discovered through a particular experi-
ence. In that sense, all the theoretical works on people's war do as
much harm as good.23
Even those who would invoke Guevarist 24 images of armed struggle
in support of the CLS project must, therefore, be read with the critical
eye of the warrior who knows that strategic and tactical fallacies in a
struggle against a well-armed and knowledgeable enemy will lead to dire
consequences. The intellectual who approaches guerrilla combat as an
intellectual
will try to grasp the present through preconceived ideological con-
structs and live it through books. He will be less able than others to
invent, improvise, make do with available resources, decide instantly
on bold moves when he is in a tight spot.25
Let us, then, with a critically armed consciousness, examine briefly
some key writings on the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare and
then see where, or if, CLS fits into such a scheme.
23. R. DEBRAY, REVOLUTION IN THE REVOLUTION? 20-21 (1967).
24. See, e.g., Binder, supra note 19.
25. R. DEBRAY, supra note 23, at 21.
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A. Mao Tse Tung
The defeat of the Japanese Army by the people of China during
World War II must rank as one of the prime examples of the strength
and courage of a nation in the face of an armed occupier. It is doubtful,
however, that Chinese conditions can be translated effectively into the
situation facing Crits in North America.
China is a geographically large country with an equally large popu-
lation base. During the war it was occupied by invading Japanese forces
and, as is well known, the Red Army engaged in a strategic withdrawal
known as the Long March. At the same time, a bitter internal struggle
was being waged between Mao's Communists and Chiang Kai-Chek's
Kuomintang. Only by keeping in mind each of these important factors
can we evaluate Mao's relevancy to current campaigns.
While there are many practical, historically particular factors that
make the Chinese struggle unique, the most important for present pur-
poses is the question of the relationship between small-scale guerrilla
bands engaged in hit and run warfare against the occupier and full-scale,
regular army units engaged in more traditional warfare. In contrast with
Guevarist theory,26 Maoist theory of guerrilla struggle developed under
circumstances in which a large-scale regular army (the PLA) existed and
was seen as the primary source of revolutionary struggle from the begin-
ning. 27 Therefore, in Maoist theory and practice, the roving, numerically
small, guerrilla band, was always seen as an appendage to the struggle of
the regular forces of the PLA. The primary purposes of guerrilla strug-
gle were two: 1) to aid in the establishment of base areas28 from which
the army could operate, and 2) to operate from those established base
areas to harass the enemy and subsequently expand the base area itself.
At all times, small-scale guerrilla bands were seen as secondary to the
primary struggle, which was to build a mass-based popular army. Mao
offered the following sharp criticism of those who sought to promote
small-scale, mobile bands as the primary source of armed struggle:
Some people want to increase our political influence only by means of
roving guerrilla actions, but are unwilling to increase it by undertaking
the arduous task of building up base areas and establishing the people's
political power....
The methods of correction are as follows:
26. See infra text accompanying notes 33-54.
27. See MAO TSE-TUNG, On Protracted War, in SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG,
Vol. II, at 113 (1965).
28. See On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism, id., Vol. I, at 153; Problems of Strategy
in Guerrilla War Against Japan, id., at 79.
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1. Intensify education, criticise incorrect ideas, and eradicate the
ideology of roving rebel bands.
2. Intensify education among the basic sections of the Red
Army and among recently recruited captives to counter the vaga-
bond outlook.
3. Draw active workers and peasants experienced in struggle
into the ranks of the Red Army so as to change its composition.
4. Create new units of the Red Army from among the masses of
militant workers and peasants.2 9
Even this cursory treatment of Mao's guerrilla theory makes it clear
that it cannot be applied effectively to the CLS struggle. CLS does not
face a foreign invader, it cannot rely on the nationalist feelings of the
people30 to sustain its struggle. CLS is engaged in the anti-imperialist
struggle in the belly of the beast itself. Moreover, CLS does not have a
firmly established base area from which guerrilla bands can operate. Re-
cent events at the Harvard Law School show that CLS hegemony does
not exist in a defined geographical area, so that thoughts of expansion
through a war of the flea are unrealistic. 31
Finally, Binder 32 seems to idealize the whole of CLS as a guerrilla
band. Thus, the idea of a guerrilla band as an appendage to a popular
army is foreign to internal perspectives on the nature of the CLS guerrilla
struggle. Rather, Binder seemingly prefers a Guevarist approach, one
that is, unfortunately for the self-styled freedom fighters, as far from real-
ity as the Maoist vision.
B. Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare
While Binder seems more than willing to invoke the thoughts and
imagery of Che's battle for the purposes of enhancing his vision of the
CLS struggle, he is unwilling to learn the primary lesson of Che's life, the
historic specificity of all sites of guerrilla warfare. 33
The fundamental principles of Guevarist armed struggle are found
in Che's own manual of guerrilla warfare34 and Debray's elaboration of
29. On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party, id., at 105, 114.
30. See generally Vo NGUYEN GIAP, NATIONAL LIBERATION WAR IN VIETNAM; GEN-
ERAL LINE, STRATEGY, TACTICS (1971).
31. Despite overwhelmingly favorable outside references, Clare Dalton failed to receive
the required two-thirds vote for tenure largely, it is believed, because her right wing opponents
did not want another Feminist/Crit. David Trubeck, visiting from Wisconsin, received the
required majority for an offer of a permanent position. After direct lobbying by opponents,
Harvard President Bok intervened directly to "avoid further conflict," overruled the faculty
and withdrew the offer.
32. See Binder, supra note 19, at 1-14.
33. Id.
34. See generally C. GUEVARA, GUERRILLA WARFARE (1961).
thefoco theory. 35 "The guerrilla band is an armed nucleus, the fighting
vanguard of the people."' 36 The key to guerrilla warfare is found in the
nature and size of the guerrilla band. It is small, mobile,37 its tactics and
movements are flexible; 38 it operates and moves by night, it has an inti-
mate knowledge of the local terrain. After its initial successes, it sets
about to educate the masses, to engage in acts of organization and armed
propaganda. 39 In its first phase, its primary function is to survive. In
subsequent phases, its functions are to fight and to grow, 4° and finally to
serve as the nucleus around which a popular army can form.41 At this
stage, the guerrilla base begins to take on a marked resemblance to the
Maoist concept of the base area.42 Yet fundamental conceptual and
practical issues clearly differentiate Guevarism from Maoism in its out-
look on guerrilla warfare.
The primary distinction between the two views is organizational.
Maoist theory sees the guerrilla band as dependent upon the popular or
people's army, it is a secondary form of struggle that arises out of a mass
movement. Guevarist theory, on the other hand, is clearly hierarchical,
elitist, and vanguardist. In other words, the mass movement that will
signal the final victory of the revolution arises out of the guerrilla strug-
gle that precedes it. While in the Maoist vision, the guerrilla war is a
symptom of mass struggle, in Guevarist theory, guerrilla war creates
mass struggle. Rather than wait for objective, historical, dialectical con-
ditions to warrant guerrilla activity, Che states:
"It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making the revolution
exist; the insurrection can create them.43"'
This Leninist view of armed struggle has certain necessary conse-
quences. Whereas in China the Party played the vanguardist role and
was intimately linked with the armed struggle, under Che the Party
played a secondary and largely insignificant role. This was so for three
35. R. DEBRAY, supra note 23, at 59-65. Afoco is that area that can be "controlled" by
the guerrilla band in the sense that it can enjoy relative freedom of movement and action.
Because mobility is a primary asset of the guerrilla band, a foco is not a military base in the
traditional sense. Because the guerrilla band is not a regular or popular army, afoco is also not
a base area as elaborated by Chinese practice.
36. C. GUEVARA, supra note 34, at 4.
37. Id. at 9; see also R. DEBRAY, supra note 23, at 32-45. "Constant vigilance, constant
mistrust, constant mobility." Id. at 42.
38. C. GUEVARA, supra note 34, at 12.
39. R. DEBRAY, supra note 23, at 50-51.
40. "As soon as the survival of the guerrilla band has been assured, it should fight." C.
GUEVARA, supra note 34, at 19.
41. Id. at 32.
42. See R. DEBRAY, supra note 23, at 59.
43. C. GUEVARA, supra note 34, at 1.
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reasons: First, the Guevarist guerrilla lives in rural areas, his vision is
linked to the historical memory of the Cuban Revolution's base in the
mountains of the Sierra Maestra.44 Because the primary center for Com-
munist Party activity in Latin America was among the urban working
class, the guerrilla band acted on a stage removed from the physical pres-
ence of the Party.
This leads to the second reason for the separation of the guerrilla
and the Party. The Party is made up of urbanized leaders, leaders who
are, in the Guevarist vision, softened by the comforts of city life.45 The
real revolutionary, the one who is at the forefront of the struggle, who
risks her life every day, is the guerrilla. Thus, the real struggle takes
place in the countryside, where the authentic leaders must be found.
Finally, the relationship between the Party (city) and the guerrilla
(country) is fraught with strategic and tactical dangers and difficulties.
The guerrilla may be dependent on the city for financial resources, lead-
ing to resentment and inefficiency. Moreover, efforts to coordinate re-
quire descent into the city by the guerrilla, increasing the danger of
capture and betrayal. For all these reasons, the guerrilla, the person en-
gaged in armed struggle, must be given primacy in the leadership of the
revolution.
To envisage CLS as a form of guerrilla warfare on the Guevarist
model is to court many dangers. The most obvious is the danger of
vanguardist elitism, often denounced in key CLS texts.46 This may be
somewhat tempered by the fact that CLS is by its very nature elitist in
that we work and operate within an elite institution, the law school. Yet
it remains obviously inimical to the self-professed CLS project of "de-
mocratization" of law and legal education to see ourselves as the van-
guard of the revolution, from whose struggles the masses of the Americas
will rise up and overthrow oppression.
Such a conception is also inimical to the internal structures of CLS.
While problems of hierarchy persist within the organization, 47 it is a very
loosely-based, voluntarist, almost anarchic body. To argue that CLS
could, as a body, be seen as a highly mobile, flexible, well-organized band
of fighters engaged in a fight for a victory in which "[tlo conquer is to
accept as a matter of principle that life, for the revolutionary, is not the
supreme good" 48 is ludicrous.
44. Id. at 2.
45. See R. DEBRAY, supra note 23, at 67-71.
46. See, e.g., D. KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 98.
47. See Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1023-28.
48. R. DEBRAY, supra note 23, at 58.
From another perspective, internal to Guevarist conceptions of the
ultimate goal of guerrilla warfare, one in which "the absolute coopera-
tion of the people" 49 is necessary, the isolated nature of the CLS enter-
prise becomes problematic. If CLS is guerrilla warfare, then it must have
as its aim the democratization of society as a whole, not just the law
school, and it must seek to mobilize the people, not just law students and
teachers. At both the level of an internal and external Guevarist critique
and of a critique of Guevarism, CLS is not guerrilla warfare.
At the same time, however, certain analogies can be drawn and
some symbolic references made. CLS or some of its members may well
wish to see itself or themselves as a revolutionary vanguard. While the
absence of a regular army may deprive CLS of Maoist pretensions, it is
possible to conceive of Cambridge or Palo Alto or Buffalo as focos from
which guerrilla operations can be launched. Memos, speeches, and law
review articles may all be seen as examples of using arms captured from
the enemy for a revolutionary purpose.5 0 Control of appointments51 can
be seen as the implementation of a key guerrilla strategy. "A close watch
over the points of access is, however, an axiom never to be forgotten by
the guerrilla fighter. ' '52
But such symbolic invocation of the rhetoric of guerrilla warfare
falls victim to its own logic, for it ignores the key and fundamental points
of Che's theory-clandestinity and its link to survival.53 "At the outset,
the essential task of the guerrilla fighter is to keep himself from being
destroyed."' 54 The very public nature of the struggle of CLS, its mem-
bers, and their weapons make it inimical to the theory and practice of
guerrilla warfare as expounded by Guevara. Yet there is perhaps a grain
of truth that can be extracted from the image of CLS as guerrilla warfare
and that might help in constructing a vision of the moral terrorist project
that I see as the only hope for CLS as a truly revolutionary endeavour.
That grain of truth finds its roots neither in the rural guerrilla practices
of Mao or Che, but in the experiences of the later phenomenon of the
"urban guerrilla."
49. C. GUEVARA, supra note 34, at 10.
50. Id. at 9. "On unfavourable ground, the guerrilla weapon is the personal weapon of
rapid fire." Id. at 27.
51. Although this remains a highly contentious issue within CLS itself. See, e.g., Frug,
supra note 15, at 687 n.113.
52, C. GUEVARA, supra note 34, at 20.
53. "The revolutionary, guerrilla force is clandestine. It is born and develops secretly.
The fighters themselves are pseudonyms." R. DEBRAY, supra note 23, at 41.
54. C. GUEVARA, supra note 34, at 9.
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II. On CLS as Urban Guerrilla Warfare
I ain't gonna work on Maggie's farm no more.
-Bob Dylan
Unlike Guevarist theories of rural guerrilla warfare, which were ap-
plied in "underdeveloped" areas of Latin America (Cuba and Bolivia),
urban guerrilla warfare arose in metropolitan, industrialized centers such
as Montevideo (the Tupamaros) and Sao Paulo (Accion libertadora).
The key theorist of urban guerrilla warfare, Carlos Marighela 55 made it
clear from the beginning that he had learned the lessons of contingency
ignored by the others. He rejected the theory and practice of the foco56
and adopted a plan of attack based on Brazil's peculiar conditions. He
saw the armed struggle as encompassing three aspects: urban guerrilla
warfare, psychological warfare, and rural guerrilla warfare, and, because
of the immensity of Brazil, conceived of guerrilla warfare as a war of
movement in all its aspects. 57
Like Guevarists, however, urban guerrillas see themselves as the
revolutionary vanguard of the people, not the armed branch of a political
party.58 Moreover, like the Guevarists, they seek to make a revolution
from the top down--"to transform the political crisis into an armed
struggle by the people against the military powers." 59
Instead of being organized around the idea of the foco, the urban
guerrilla is organized into "fire groups" (grupos delfuego). Each small
group then seeks to commit various acts of politically correct urban guer-
rilla warfare. Their tactics are aggressive and types of actions include:
assaults, occupations, ambushes, traffic disruptions, capturing arms and
explosives, sabotage, kidnappings, armed propaganda, and terrorism.
60
55. See generally CARLOS MARIGHELA, ACCION LIBERTADORA (1970).
56. "Nuestro combate contra el imperialismo se lleva cabo con conceptos nuevosy caracter-
isticas proprias y po eso no nos preocupamos por abrir en Brasil un foco guerrillero cualquiera."
"El papel De La Accion Revolucionaria En La Organizacion," id. at 18.
57. "Partiendo del hecho de que Brasil es un pais continental la inmensidad de su area,
enfocamas la guerrilla como guerra de movimiento y no como foco." Id.
58. "La guerrilla no es el brazo armado de un partido o de una organizacion politica sea
cual sea. La guerrilla es ella misma el mando politico y militar de la revolucion. " Id. at 41.
59. Id. at 26. ("nuestro principo estrategico es transformar la crisis politica en lucha ar-
mada del pueblo contra el poder militar").
60. Id. at 91, 117 Terrorism is also now seen as a very effective and integral part of
guerrilla struggle in Peru. The Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) group has developed from its
rural roots to an organization that commits acts of terror and sabotage in both rural and urban
areas. See Berg, Sendero Luminoso and the Peasantry of Andahuaylas, 28 J. INTERAMERICAN
STUD. & WORLD AFF. 165 (1986-87); Granados, El Partito Comunista Del Peru Sendero
Luminoso-Approximaciones a Su Idelogia, 37 SOCIALISMO Y PARTICIPACION 15 (1987);
Palmer, Rebellion in Rural Peru-The Origins and Evolution of Sendero Luminoso, in COM-
PARATIVE POLITICS 127 (1986).
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Unlike the rural guerrilla who is required to live much of his life
separate and apart from the people, the urban guerrilla must adapt to the
conditions of his environment by being able to live, unnoticed, in the
midst of the ordinary citizens.61 He must be technically proficient in or-
der to carry out actions and most importantly, he must know how to
shoot. The raison d'etre and key to survival of the urban guerilla is his
ability with a gun: "La razon de ser del guerrillo urbano, la condicion
fundamental de su actuacion y superviviencia es el tiro. "62
The primary difficulties again, in drawing upon the practice and im-
agery of urban guerrilla warfare to define CLS, are those of vanguardism
and clandestinity. The urban guerrilla seeks to bring about the revolu-
tion by example, by leading rather than by building a mass movement up
to a moment when armed struggle is deemed necessary and inevitable.
He must remain hidden, or at least his function as a guerrilla requires
him to pass himself off in public as someone and something he is not.
Again, CLS sees itself as public and as nonelitist. To invoke the image of
guerrilla warfare is to falsify both armed struggle and CLS.
Yet there is a point at which the theory and practice of urban guer-
rilla warfare bring us a step closer to a politically correct view of the
functions of moral terrorism. Unlike rural guerrilla theory, which sees
terrorism and sabotage as secondary because of the urban nature of its
targets, 63 the practice of the urban guerrilla is more closely related to acts
that can be perceived as "terrorist"-revolutionary expropriations (bank
robberies), kidnappings, bombing, and sabotage, are all clearly identified
as "terrorist" acts. Moreover, they are more integrally a part of urban
guerrilla practice. It is an essential part of the practice of the urban guer-
rilla, requiring great technical skill, 64 and it is a form of practical armed
struggle that must form a part of the guerrilla's armory. "El terrorismo
es un arma a la que jamas el revolucionario puede renunciar. "65
Thus, terrorism is seen as an essential, not a secondary, part of the
urban struggle. In keeping with Marighela's view of the conjunction of
urban and rural strategies and their union in the psychological war, ter-
rorism plays an essential role in the creation of armed propaganda. The
guerrilla inspires the masses to join him in the struggle against oppres-
sion through the example of the deed, the revolutionary act, followed by
61. "El guerrillero urbano debe saber vivir en medio del pueblo y tener cuidado para no
parecer extrano y divorciado de la vida del cuidando comunn." C. MARIGHELA, supra note 55,
at 94.
62. Id. at 100.
63. See C. GUEVARA, supra note 34, at 15-16; R. DEBRAY, supra note 23, at 80.
64. C. MARIGHELA, supra note 55, at 131.
65. Id. at 132.
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more traditional written forms of information. 6 The combination of all
guerilla actions, including armed struggle, is the best way to perform
armed propaganda. At this stage of the struggle, intellectuals, as "the
most advanced urban guerrilla weapon," 67 play a key role. An examina-
tion of the nature and practice of "terrorism" through a look at the ac-
tual practice of the two most notorious urban guerrilla groups in
Europe-the German Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Fraction-
RAF) and the Italian Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades-BR) will offer the
next step in the development of a theory and practice of CLS as moral
terrorism.
III. The Practice of Terror-The BR and the RAF
Honest to the point of recklessness.
-The Grateful Dead
Before I enter into a study of the BR and the RAF, a brief diversion
into the semantic horrors of "terrorism" is appropriate. While even anti-
terrorists68 admit that sophisticated analysis is required to understand
terrorism properly, the most commonly accepted vision of the terrorist
phenomenon can be found in Wilkinson's statement:
Terrorists do not recognize any rules of conventions of war for com-
batants, non-combatants or the treatment of prisoners. They use par-
ticularly ruthless weapons and methods to attack civilians, including
foreigners who are not remotely involved. Their typical weapons are
bombings, assassinations, massacres and bargaining with lives of hos-
tages. Political terrorism is therefore unpredictable and arbitrary, and
can be seen as an attempt to exercise a peculiar kind of tyranny over its
victims. 6
9
Leaving aside the question of state terrorism (Dresden, Hiroshima,
Belfast, Soweto, Harlem-but keeping it always in mind), terrorism as
defined by its opponents has two primary facets: it is politically moti-
vated violence and it is indiscriminate violence. While the question of
political motivation is an interesting one,70 it is not at all, for present
purposes, unacceptable. The issue of the indiscriminate nature of terror-
ism, however, is more problematic. It is certainly true, for example, that
terrorist acts can be, and are, aimed at civilian populations, so-called
66. "El conjunto de las acciones realizadaspor elguerrillero urbano, e incluso cada una de
sus acciones armadas, constituye la principal manera de hacer la propaganda armada. " Id.
67. "El guerrillero urbano intelectual o artista es lamas moderna adquisicion de la guerra
revolucionaria brasilena. " Id. at 146.
68. See Falk, supra note 7, at 30.
69. Wilkinson, supra note 16, at 4.
70. See Hocking, Orthodox Theories of 'Terrorism' The Power of Politicised Terminology,
19 POL. 103 (1984).
nonmilitary targets. Yet within the logic of the politico-military aims of
some organizations, this is the most efficacious means of struggle. In the
Algerian War of Independence against French colonialism, civilian
populations were targeted for bomb attacks by both the Left and the
Right. The population of France was indeed effectively terrorized and
Algeria gained its independence. But in a national war of liberation can
it truly be said that the metropole is innocent and immune from attack?
On the other hand, terrorist attacks against unarmed civilian popu-
lations may be counterproductive. In a national liberation struggle, the
goal may well be to terrorize the civilian population of the colonizer in
order to weaken domestic political will. In other forms of struggle such
as those entered into by the BR or the RAF, terror aimed at the general
population almost certainly will not lead to mass mobilization in favor of
the armed vanguard.7' For the terrorist, however, who sees herself as
engaging in the only available means to open up a better world, these
questions are not ones of the moral worth of individual lives72 lost "inno-
cently," but of the inevitable logic of armed struggle. They are in other
words, tactical and strategical issues, not fundamentally moral ones. The
condemnation of terrorism as indiscriminate, then, if accurate, is based
on a moral premise that is incommensurable with the practice and practi-
tioners of terrorism.
In reality, however, most "terrorist" acts committed by groups like
the BR and RAF are not, in that sense, indiscriminate. As Young points
out, 73 militarily speaking, effective terrorism requires discreet targets.
Spokespersons for "terrorist" groups often issue public apologies for and
condemnations of attacks on innocent civilians. Finally, surprise is not
the same as a lack of discrimination in target choice. A detailed study of
one of the most active "terrorist" groups in Europe, the Basque libera-
tion movement Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA),74 shows quite clearly that
indiscriminate violence is not a part of armed "terrorist" struggle. Clark
states and demonstrates that
we see in ETA's attacks not random, senseless killing and wounding,
but rather acts carefully chosen with great attention to their potential
impact on their surrounding political environment. Ever since ETA's
Fourth Assembly adopted the action-repression-action spiral theory in
71. See Friedland, The Psychological Impact of Terrorism: A Double-Edged Sword, 6
POL. PSYCHOLOGY 591, 598 (1985).
72. Young, Revolutionary Terrorism, Crime and Morality, 4 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 287
(1977).
73. Young, supra note 72, at 288-95.
74. Clark, Patterns of ETA Violence: 1968-1980 in POLITICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 6, at
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1965, the organization has demonstrated a very great concern for the
instrumental role that violence plays in its overall strategy. Despite a
fairly small number of unfortunate and tragic mistakes, there is consid-
erable evidence that ETA plans its attacks with great care to maximize
the symbolic and communicative aspects of the violence while mini-
mizing its adverse impact on bystanders and other noncombatants. 7"
Clark here hits upon the two keys to gaining an understanding of the
realities and potentialities of terrorism. It is not indiscriminate, rather it
is a calculated violence. More importantly, terrorist acts of violence are
acts of meaning, symbolic acts, they are a form of revolutionary writing.
If as Cover says76 the word is violence, terrorism seeks to demonstrate
the corollary, that violence is the word. Bombing, kidnapping, bank rob-
bery, each has a significance that goes beyond the mere act, a symbolic
trace that writes the bomb under erasure.77 In constructing themselves
as a community of resistance to the dominant forms of oppression in
society, an urban guerilla band or firing group, offers up the Armalite as
post-modem hermeneutic.78 The urban guerilla, convinced of the break-
down of society, of the monopolization and exploitation of means of ex-
pression, and the creation of social meaning,79 seeks to escape by
75. Id. See also P. GUELL, LA EVOLUCION ESTRATEGICA DE ETA: DE LA "GUERRA
REVOLUCIONARIA" (1963); P. GUELL, A LA NEGOCIACION (1987) (a complete military, polit-
ical and ideological history of the ETA and the struggle for Basque Freedom).
76. Cover, supra note 3, at 1601.
77. See J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (1974).
78. Robert Cover writes:
In interpreting a text of resistance, any community must come to grips with violence.
It must think through the implications of living as a victim or perpetrator of violence
in the contexts in which violence is likely to arise. Violence - as a technique either
to achieve or to suppress interpretations or the living of them - may be said to put a
high price on those interpretations. But an "economic" approach here is misleading.
For the understanding of law is the projection not only of what we would in fact do
under different circumstances, but also of what we ought to do. And we commonly
believe situations of violent interaction to be dominated by special principles and
values. The invocation of these special principles, values, and even myths is a part of
the hermeneutic of the texts of resistance.
Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 50 (1983).
79. Greisman, Social Meanings of Terrorism: Reification, Violence, and Social Control, 1
CONTEMP. CRIsEs 303 (1977) states:
The variable modalities of meaning that attend terrorism are the products of socially
constructed realities. Some groups have greater ability to construct reality for less
influential groups, and the former tend to control the process by which social mean-
ings are assigned. As this reality is constructed, the "spectators" of terrorist acts are
encouraged to identify with perpetrators or victims as the situation warrants. This
identification with the perpetrator effectively removes the terrorist meaning. Fre-
quently, this process is carried a step further, and the spectators, victims, and ter-
rorists themselves become encapsulated in a reified consciousness. When reification
occurs, the fundamentally social nature of an act is masked by an artificial
objectivity.
performing significant and signifying acts to an audience that is stunned
into hermeneutic attention by "the one quality that gives terrorism its
unique place in the catalogue of organized violence. Terrorist acts re-
quire an audience, the target is of secondary importance, i.e. those that
see the target attacked will become terrorized and this is the real goal of
terrorism."' 80 Thus the primary goal of terrorism is to terrorize, and peo-
ple are terrorized when their base of meaning, their hermeneutic vision of
the world, is upset, deconstructed, and put into question. When "nor-
mal" means of dissent are no longer open, when access to usual means of
knowledge creation is blocked, the violence of the word is replaced with
the word of violence.81 Both the BR and the RAF can be seen as arising
in a circumstance where the hermeneutic of Italian and German society
was in turmoil and where the only available mechanism for creating a
competing truth was terror.
A. The Red Brigades
The streets of Rome are filled with rubble.
-Bob Dylan
The Brigate Rosse grew out of the events in Italy during the seminal
year of 1968. Norberto Bobbio offers the following summary of the socio-
psycho hermeneutic of that time in Italian politics:
1968 should be considered as the starting point of this so-called institu-
tional crisis: it was the culminating point of challenges by the younger
generation. One of the most characteristic aspects of these challenges,
and likewise the most deleterious in terms of the political miseducation
of youth, was a contempt for the democratic rules of the game: the
exaltation of violence-even if initially this was simply ideological-as
a means of political action; the refusal to converse with those who
thought differently; the holding of meetings where one applauded but
did not debate; the brutal and systematic invasion by minorities of are-
nas where free debate was taking place.82
80. Id. at 305.
81. See Zucconi, Funzione della parola e democrazia, 253 IL MULINo 747, 753 (1977);
Parisi, Dal terrorismo ai terroristi: Dalle parole aifatti, 253 IL MULINO 754 (1977). See gener-
ally A. SCHMID & J. DE GRAFF, VIOLENCE AS COMMUNICATION (1982).
82. Bobbio, Italy's Permanent Crisis, 54 TELOS 123 (1982-83). For a detailed analysis of
the significance of the "rupture" of 1968, see Chiesa, Del Sessantotto e del Terrorismo: Cultura
e Politica tra Continuita e Rottura, 273 IL MULINO 53 (1981). Alberto Melucci, in Appuntisu
Movimenti: Terrorismo Societa Italiana, 256 IL MULINO 253, 255 (1978) offers the following
summary of the break-down of traditional class-based practical hermeneutics in Italian society:
In particolare i nuovi movimenti che si sono manifestati negli ultimi vent' anni in tutte
le societa di capitalismo maturo sono gli embrioni di una trasformazione radicale nei
contenuti, nei luoghi, negli attori delle lotte di classe ... Non bisogna tuttavia dimenti-
care che la linea di tendenza del sistema nel suo complesso indica la trasformazione
della classe operaia in un insieme di gruppi di interesse organizzati.
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In effect, the events of 1968 gave rise to terrorism from both the
Right and the Left because the fundamental nature of historically signifi-
cant sources of social knowledge and understanding was put radically
into question and was found wanting. All dominant social signifiers were
deconstructed and the absence of the word became a socio-political void
filled through the presence of the deed.
The demands of students in 1968 echoed those of their French and
German colleagues-the democratization of the university-the democ-
ratization of knowledge construction. At the same time, the "hot au-
tumn" of 1968 evidenced a breakdown in traditional hermeneutic
practices at work between bosses and employees. The dominance of both
the "patron" and the "union" were challenged as the very composition of
the "working class" as a homogenous body was put into question. At the
level of production of knowledge and power on a quotidian basis (the
factories and the universities) a direct challenge to dominant politico-
discursive practices was being made.
At the same time as this challenge to the dominant social construc-
tion of being and meaning was being launched from below, the top was
operating on a basis of closure. As the Italian capitalist system became
more integrated into the demands of an international market economy,
the necessity for domestic political "stability" became more evident.
This need coincided with an "increasing institutionalization of left wing
political parties and unions,"'8 3 which, of course, led to the Italian Com-
munist Party's (PCI) "historic compromise" with the Christian Demo-
crats. Not only did the dominant social forces offer a hermeneutic
closure in the events following 1968, but the dominant counter-herme-
neutic meaning-machine, the PCI, closed itself off to the demands for
radical change from the base of its natural supporters and opted instead
to pursue a path of parliamentary power-brokering. In effect, then, both
traditional and oppositional forms of creating "legitimate" political dis-
course were closed to demands from below. In an attempt to dislodge
the dominant social signifiers that repressed these alternate truth and va-
lidity claims, 4 the only option "open" was to struggle through the her-
meneutic of terror:
, . . i nuovi contenuti antagonisti si trovano progressivamente deviati
verso la necessita di resitere alla repressione, di lottare per l'apertura
83. "L'istituzionalizzazione crescente delle forze della sinistra, partiti e sindicat."
Melucci, supra note 82, at 259. For a critique of the BR from a PCI perspective see generally
TERRORISM TODAY IN ITALY AND WESTERN EUROPE (Bruno Di Biase ed. 1978).
84. See J. HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, REASON AND THE RA-
TIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (1984).
delle istituzioni, di difendersi dalla violenza di destra e dall' oscuro dis-
egno delle trame nere. 85
The BR's hermeneutic of terror was not, as its critics would have us
believe, mindless or indiscriminate. Rather it was a carefully planned,
well-scripted scenario, meant to inscribe the graphe of terror into the
heart of Italian political discourse. 86 Their organizational plan clearly
was based on traditional urban guerilla models (Marighela), small groups
operating independently. Their strategy was clearly Leninist, in that
they intended to bring about the revolution from above 87 rather than
through the slower process of grass-roots, mass-based politics. A brief
survey of the historical development of their "actions" shows both the
discriminate and symbolic nature of Italian "terrorism. ' 88 The first "ac-
tions" took place against local "symbols" of oppression, for example,
burning the cars of factory managers with a reputation for bad dealings
with workers. Next, kidnappings of executives, followed by revolution-
ary interrogations, took place. At this early stage, the actions and sym-
bolism of BR activities resonated with traditional Marxist iconography
and focused on members of the industrial bourgeoisie. Acts of violence
against their persons and property were meant to write under erasure, to
indicate a dialectical reversal of order and meaning in Italian industrial
society. But, as subsequent events would show, the subversion obtained
through their acts of production-based terror was the subversion of a
minor sub-text, a subversion of dominant discourse. Turning from a
purely industrial hermeneutic, the BR began, in the middle 1970s, to fo-
cus on the Stato Imperialista Multinazionale (the Multi-National Imperi-
alist State or SIM). The integration of state and capital became the
primary signifier that the BR sought to disintegrate. Representatives of
the state were now targeted as the main discursive opponent. Mario
Sossi, state prosecutor in Genoa, was kidnapped and later released. In
1976, Genovese Judge Francesco Coco was shot to death, the first delib-
85. Melucci, supra note 82, at 258. See also A. SiuJ, NEVER AGAIN WITHOUT RILES
(1979) (history of the early days of the BR).
. 86. "[T]he BR violence was not mindless. On the contrary, it resulted from careful delib-
eration and strategic analysis: the BR said what it did, and did what it said." Salvioni &
Stephanson, Reflections on the Red Brigades, 29 ORBIS 489, 490 (1985). For brief surveys of
BR "actions" see Legault, La Dynamique du Terrorisme: Le Cas des Brigades Rouges, 14
ETUDES INTERNATIONALES 639 (1983); Pisano, The Red Brigades. A Challenge td Italian
Democracy, 120 CONFLICT STUD. 1 (1980).
87. Although the BR did engage in some social struggle on a mass base, they remained
primarily a clandestine, urban guerrilla operation. This separated them clearly from the more
amorphous and spontaneous "Movement" of which Tony Negri was a more or less prominent
ideologue. See T. NEGRI & M. TRANTI, THE SOCIAL FACTORY, SEMIOTEXT(e) 1519 (1986).
88. For the best accounts see G. BOCCA, IL TERRORISMO ITALIANO, 1970-1978 (1978)
and G. BOCCA, Noi TERRORISTI (1985).
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erate BR execution. In the meantime, magistrates, journalists, industri-
alists, and police officers were "kneecapped." 89
It is perhaps "kneecapping" that is the most well-remembered BR
tactic. This public memory of kneecapping is evidence of its strong ter-
rorizing and symbolic effect. The targets are representatives of SIM and
the inscription of semiotic meaning is graphically physical, but not
deadly. Rather SIM is literally and symbolically crippled, constantly
and forever symbolizing a limping, aging corporate capitalism.
In 1978, the BR carried out its most infamous and symbolically
powerful single action. Aldo Moro, a former Prime Minister, was kid-
napped and killed after fifty-five days of captivity. The BR then "sym-
bolically left the body in Via Caetani between the party headquarters of
the DC and the PCI." 90 Thus, the kidnapping and execution of Moro
filled the world of political meaning with a powerful new hermeneutic.
The body of SIM was no longer immune from extinction; rather than
writing under erasure, it was erased. At the very heart of the historic
compromise in Via Caetani, the rotting corpse of Left and Right tradi-
tional political dialogue was on public view.
At the same time as BR reached its height of dramatic hermeneutic
openness, the dialectic of violence and repression took its hold. Bk ac-
tivists were killed or captured, some engaging in the public ritual of re-
canting, thereby reinforcing the semiotic superiority of the Italian state
through a rejection of BR hermeneutics from a position that is simultane-
ously inside and outside the hermeneutic circle of "terror." Moreover,
and perhaps much more significantly, "Perhaps worst of all for the BR,
however, people got used to terrorism: it lost its shock value and became
business as usual. The absence of terrorism, ironically, achieved greater
media coverage than the isolated attacks themselves." 91Terror became
the victim of that which it sought to undermine. Rather than deconstruct
socio-political discourse in Italian culture, it became an integral part of
the culture. The deconstructive incision 92 became, perhaps inevitably,
involved and implicated, complacent in that which it sought to under-
mine. The outlaw becomes the in-law, a married accomplice of the evil it
seeks to avoid. Terror is submerged in the larger terror of civilization.
89. "Kneecapping" is a strategy whereby shots are fired into the patella (kneecap) of the
victim. This results in extreme pain and permanent crippling, but not death.
90. Salvioni & Stephanson, supra note 86, at 500.
91. Id. at 506.
92. See J. DERRIDA, POSITIONS (1981) at 82; La Loi du genre/The Law of Genre, 7
GLYPH 176 (1980).
B. Rote Armee Fraktion-RAF
Test me, test me
Why don't you arrest me?
Throw me in the jailhouse
-The Grateful Dead
Like its Italian BR counterpart, Germany's RAF grew out of the
events and semiotic fluxes of 1968.93 Like its Italian BR counterpart, the
RAF arose in a country with a Fascist past where the hegemonic politics
of compromise, epitomized by social democracy and the outlaw stature
of the Communist Party, closed off the mainstream political discursive
practice from radical "internal" questioning.
And like the BR, the RAF's first symbolic act took place against a
symbol of modern capital, a department store.94 On April 2, 1968, a fire-
bombing of a Frankfurt department store was carried out by Gudrun
Ensslin, Andreas Baader, Thorwald Proll, and Horst Sohnlein. Horst
Mahler, later a dominant RAF theorist, acted as Baader's lawyer. Like
the BR, the German RAF turned from violence against property, to vio-
lence against persons, such as kidnapping. The RAF advanced from at-
tacks on representative symbols of capital to representative symbols of
the state and international capital, in many instances against NATO
installations.95
From the very beginning of its struggle, the RAF recognized that it
was engaged in a struggle for the social construction of meaning. One of
its earliest and most persistent targets was the Springer Publishing Enter-
prise. The RAF counterattacked the violence of the word of the Springer
press with the word of violence. In one of its early communiques, 96 is-
sued after a bomb attack on Springer, the RAF made its interpretive
position clear:
Yesterday, Friday May 19th, at 3:55, two bombs exploded in the
Springer skyscraper in Hamburg. Since, in spite of prompt and urgent
93. See generally Billig, supra note 8, at 29; Wasmund, supra note 9; Chaldek, Le terror-
isme en Allemagne Federale, 51 POLITIQUE ETRANGERE 937 (1986); Ruschetta, Le due "an-
ime" della Rote Armee Fraktion, 308 IL MULINO 995 (1986); Horchem, West Germany's Red
Army Anarchists, in THE NEW TERRORISM, supra note 16, at 199; TERRORISM IN WEST GER-
MANY, CONFLICT STUDIES JOURNAL 1 (1986).
94. The RAF were perhaps the first to recognize and attack what Fredric Jameson has
described as the cultural logic of post-modernism. By beginning their campaign of terror by
destroying consumerism, by engulfing consumption in flames, the RAF started out its herme-
neutic practice against the alienation of capitalist society. See Jameson, Postmodernism, Or the
Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, 146 NEW LEFT REV. 53. 64 (1984).
95. See STOKE NEWISTON 8 DEFENSE GROUP, Chronology, in ARMED RESISTANCE IN
WEST GERMANY: DOCUMENTS OF THE RED ARMY FRACTION 11-17 (1972).
96. Id. at 60-61.
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warnings, the building wasn't cleared, 17 people were injured. The
first warning was phoned through at 3:29 with the request that the
building be cleared within 15 minutes because of a bomb. The reply
was: stop this nonsense. The call was cut off.
The second call was made at 3:31. It said: if you don't clear the
building immediately something terrible will happen. But the telepho-
nists clearly had instructions to ignore such calls. The third call, at
3:36, went to the pigs: look out, for Christ's sake make sure that the
building is cleared.
Because the Springer concern cannot suppress the fact that warn-
ings were given, they distort the message: they say there was only one
warning and that came too late. Two telephonists and the pigs can
confirm that the Springer press is lying once again.
Springer would rather take the risk of his workers and employees
being injured by bombs than the risk of losing a couple of hours work-
ing time. He would have lost profit through a false alarm. For capital-
ists profit is everything and the people who produce it for them are no
better than shit. We are deeply shocked that workers and employees
have been wounded.
We demand of Springer that his papers stop their hysterical it-
tacks on the New Left, on working-class solidarity actions such as
strikes, on Communists here and in other countries, on liberation
movements in the third world, particularly the Arab people who are
fighting for the liberation of Palestine; that he stop his propaganda in
support of Zionism, the imperialist politics of the Israeli ruling class;
that he stop printing lying racist reports about foreign workers here.
We demand that the Springer press print these communiques.
We demand nothing impossible. We will only stop our actions
against the enemy of the people when our demands are met.
Expropriate Springer!
Expropriate the enemy of the people!
The similarities with the Italian BR extend to organizational and
theatrical practices. Most importantly, like all urban guerilla groups, the
RAF is fundamentally vanguardist and seeks to create revolution from
above by provoking and heightening acts of state violence and repression.
In its major theoretical presentation on the subject, The Concept of the
Urban Guerilla,97 the RAF makes its vanguardist, actionist vision quite
clear:
We state that without revolutionary initiative, without practical revo-
lutionary intervention of the avant-guard, the socialist workers and the
intellectuals, and without concrete anti-imperialist struggle, there will
be no unifying process.... Here, the role of the urban guerilla can only
be the method of revolutionary intervention of generally weak revolu-
tionary forces.
97. Id. at 33.
1. Urban guerilla warfare is based on the analysis that there will be
no Prussian order of march in which the many so-called revolution-
aries will lead the people into revolutionary struggle.
2. It's based on the analysis that when the conditions are right for
armed struggle it will be too late to prepare for it.
Therefore, like the Italian BR, the German RAF saw itself as engag-
ing in a battle wherein the dominant, signifying forces would be immo-
lated in a constructive, semiotic fire-bombing. The RAF, however, from
its earliest days, made a signifying turn that would ultimately undermine
and deconstruct its own (de) constructive strategy.
The semiotic flux of terrorism aims at challenging the dominant
forms of meaning in developed Western capitalist societies. Thus, at-
tacks are based on symbols-factories, managers, judges, banks-that
are thereby denatured and shown to be subvertible through the imposi-
tion of a hermeneutic of counter-violence. People are terrified because
their anchors to the world are sent floating free as meaning is put up for
grabs. The mistake, the semiotic fallacy, committed by the RAF was to
turn the terrorist him- or her- self into the dominant signifier, by taking
the struggle away from de-territorializing dominant signifiers and focus-
ing instead on re-territorializing "terrorists." 98
Thus, after Baader was imprisoned for the Frankfurt fire bombings,
Mahler, his lawyer, and Ensslin broke him out "in a hail of gunfire."
While Wasmund claims that "[a] crucial point with regard to the begin-
nings of the RAF is that with the liberation of Baader, the people in-
volved in this action irrevocably severed their connections with
society," 99 it is more significant and signifying for the entire construction
of meaning within RAF discourse. As Wasmund himself notes
With the liberation of Baader, the basic pattern and the central motive
for all future actions of the RAF and its subsequent organizations were
established. That is, if one or more members of the organization were
in custody the others were to concentrate all their energy on the libera-
tion of their comrades in prison. 00
Thereafter, RAF sought its meaning on what became a purely internal
and introspective level. Its public actions, like kidnapping, became not
means to the end of constructing a terror-ridden deconstruction of Ger-
man socio-psycho political discourse, but rather means to the end of free-
98. See Deleuze & Guattari, Anti-Oedipus and Discourse; Salvioni & Stephanson, supra
note 86, at 498 n.25 (reference omitted). ("[L]anguage must be eradicated from the fetishism
of normality, from the prison of no sense spoken, to recompose itself as delight, as a desiring
machine against power.").
99. Wasmund, supra note 9, at 226.
100. Id.
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ing its members from prison.10 1 The hermeneutic practice turned
inevitably inward as the RAF, instead of creating a public discourse of
terror, embarked on a private construction of idiolect. In essence, they
ended up talking to themselves, forgetting in the process the hermeneutic
purpose of terror.
IV. On Critical Legal Studies as Moral Terrorism
The thoughts are broken
Perhaps they're better left unsung
I don't know, I don't care
Let there be songs to fill the air
-The Grateful Dead
What, then, are the lessons to be drawn from the preceding discus-
sion? What does moral terrorism10 2 have to do with Critical Legal Stud-
ies? It should be quite clear that the guerrilla warfare model, adopted by
opponents and proponents of CLS, is grossly inappropriate. Guerrilla
warfare is a means of achieving military victory over an opponent by
stirring the masses to revolutionary fervor. It is conducted from base
areas or focos in its rural version, from safe houses in its urban manifes-
tation. It is elitist and has no real connection with mass movements or
parties on the Left. Finally, by its very nature, it must be clandestine.
Critical Legal Studies is not a military movement, it is an intellec-
tual movement. Indeed, it is one within which even military or propa-
ganda moves that might involve "the masses" in law schools are
questioned by many members. 103 CLS is not, formally at least, an elitist,
Leninist, tight-knit politico-military operation, it is quite the opposite.
101. There was some attempt to construct a counter-narrative. Horst Mahler denounced
the demand from the RAF kidnappers of the Chairman of the Berlin Christian Democratic
Union that he and other RAF prisoners be released in exchange for the hostage, accusing his
former comrades of betraying the socialist revolution. See Billig, supra note 8, at 36. In a
similar fashion he refused to participate in hunger strikes and other actions within the prison
in protest of the German Government's policy of separating RAF prisoners from each other by
placing them in different institutions. While the campaign against "isolation" became a key
point for the RAF, Mahler denounced it as elitist and preferred to live and agitate among the
"normals." This, in the end, meant that Mahler had to distance himself from the vanguardist
premise at the base of RAF theory and practice. On the contradiction and conflict within
RAF, see Ruschetta, supra note 93, at 997-98.
102. Although I have personally elaborated a schematic approach in my written work, see
supra notes 2 and 5, and I have attempted to practice moral terrorism in my teaching life,
moral terrorism, under this and other rubrics, has a certain intellectual pedigree, both inside
and outside CLS. Examples from within CLS can be found in the issues of Lizard, which
appeared at the San Francisco AALS meeting in 1984. My personal favorite is entitled 2
Cultural Terrorism and the Faculty Cocktail Party, LIZARD 3.
103. See Frug, supra note 15, at 697, in which Duncan's ideas of anarcho-syndicalist ac-
tions in the law schools involving students are questioned.
Nor does it really seek connection with "the masses" outside law
schools. 10 4 Grits are intellectuals and scholars and CLS is not clandes-
tine, nor do its "operations" and "actions" depend on secrecy. On the
contrary, the effectiveness of CLS relies on publicity, on Duncan's pic-
ture in Time, on law review articles, seminars, speeches at the AALS
annual meetings, etc. Crits are not "guerrillas," operating like "fish in
the sea of the masses." They are public intellectuals working at the very
heart of the capitalist machine, the center of knowledge production, the
law school.
For those who find the CLS critique of law and its various program-
matic efforts attractive, for those who seek to adhere to its principles and
practices, two roads remain open. The first is the "Parliamentary Op-
tion," that is, CLS proponents can opt to work for a change in the system
from within the system, they can write law review articles, get tenure,
and indoctrinate students and their fellow teachers in a relatively civi-
lized manner. The problem with this choice is the problem of capture. 10 5
Crits who adopt the Parliamentary Option become accomplices in the
reproduction of the very system they claim to oppose. Like the urban-
ized Party functionaries condemned by Che and Debray, they become
soft and comfortable, they get tenure, they are acceptable, and to be ac-
ceptable is to be accepted, and to be accepted is to be no longer
dangerous.
The second path available is the path of moral terrorism. Like the
urban guerrilla we must recognize that our struggle is a struggle over the
monopolization of signifying events and structures. Unlike the urban
guerrilla, however, we cannot rely on secrecy, our "actions" must be
public (memos, articles, speeches, etc.). We must realize that our project
is dangerous, we must heed the advice of Marx and Engels: "Firstly,
never play with insurrection unless you are fully prepared to face the
consequences of your play." 10 6
The dangers are not just personal. While it is certain that moral
terrorism, acts of intellectual kneecapping, will have dire consequences
for our employment prospects, this is hardly of vital interest 0 7 in a world
104. For an excellent study of this issue and CLS's dis-connection from autonomous social
movements, see Lichterman, Social Movements and Legal Elites: Some Notes From the Margin
on the Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique, Wis. L. REV. 1035 (1984).
105. See Fraser, The Day the Music Died, supra note 5, at 890.
106. K. MARX & F. ENGELS, The Art of Insurrection, in GUERRILLA WARFARE AND
MARXISM, supra note 22, at 53.
107. 1 think here we should all heed Lichterman's credo: "Maybe the eighties motto for
those still working within conventional institutions should be 'stay in, take risks, get thrown
out.' " Lichterman, supra note 104, at 1067.
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that lives in the shadow of the mushroom cloud and where people are
starving to death on the streets of America's most wealthy cities. A few
tenure denials, in the grand scheme of things, are not really too
important. 10 8
The real danger is that encountered by the RAF, that the "terrorist"
will surpass and replace the "terror" as the primary signifier. In such
cases, the signifier/signified surplus,10 9 is lost, the cult of personality
takes over, and terror loses its hermeneutic force. This does not mean
that martyrdom is to be avoided because of this danger of the collapse of
significance. It is impossible to deny the graphic terror, etched and writ-
ten in our memory, of the Vietnamese monks, or the Czech student, who
engaged in real acts of "self-immolation." Martyrdom is an effective act
of terror and a significant hermeneutic event, but only so long as the
event, not the individual, is the focus of the construction of meaning.
Peter Sloterdijk, in his brilliant Critique of Cynical Reason, 110 offers
a vision of the possible modes of action we might choose to adopt. Trac-
ing the rise of our modem cynicism in much the same way as Adomo
and Horkheimer trace the death of Enlightenment, I he finds a counter-
current, that he calls Kynicism, and which I would prefer to describe as
anarcho-cynicism or moral terrorism. Kynicism reacts to hegemonic
thought through laughter, humorous disruption, ribaldry, and other
forms of action meant to outrage decent citizens everywhere. The classic
heroic act of kynicism, of moral terrorism, is Diogenes offending the
good citizens of the Athenian polis by publicly consorting with prosti-
tutes and joyfully masturbating in the market place. Sloterdijk offers the
following description of the morJ- terrorist's semiotic praxis.
Ancient kynicism begins the process of "naked arguments." From the
opposition, carried by the power that comes from below. The kynic
farts, shits, pisses, masturbates on the street, before the eyes of the
Athenian market. He shows contempt for fame, ridicules the architec-
ture, refuses respect, parodies the stories of gods and heroes, eats raw
meat and vegetables, lies in the sun, fools around with whores .... 1 1 2
The kynic, as a dialectical materialist, has to challenge the public
sphere because it is the only space in which the overcoming of idealist
108. This does not mean we should not fight like hell when liberals show their true colors
and try to sack our comrades. Indeed, such struggles offer many opportunities for moral ter-
rorism because the emptiness of the key liberal signifiers of "academic freedom" and "plural-
ism" give rise to a hermeneutic opening where terror can supplant the usual peaceful comforts
of academic life.
109. See M. FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE (1980).
110. P. SLOTERDUK, CRITIQUE OF CYNICAL REASON (1987).
111. T. ADORNO & M. HORKHEIMER, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT (1972).
112. P. SLOTERDUIK, supra note 110, at 103-104.
arrogance can be meaningfully demonstrated. Spirited materialism is
not satisfied with words but proceeds to a material argumentation that
rehabilitates the body. Certainly, ideas are enthroned in the academy
and urine drips discreetly into the latrine. But urine in the academy!
That would be the total dialectical tension, the art of pissing against
the idealist wind.' 1 3
This, then is our challenge. To put ourselves on the line, to engage
in acts of "macho self-immolation," to become moral terrorists, to
"whack-off " 14 in faculty meetings, to construct a praxis which is mean-
ingful, public, and dangerous. For those who may be troubled by such a
vision of kneecapped deans and car-bombed curriculum committees, I
close with the words that must become our credo:
Fuck 'em if they can't take a joke!
-Anon.
113. Id. at 105.
114. In our culture, the dominant mode of discourse in masturbation, is the phallocentric
commodification of women. See Fraser, What's Love Got to Do With It supra note 5, at 80
n.76. The art/struggle of moral terrorism is to recapture the body-experience, to recode and
reterritorialize our existence. To achieve this goal (praxis) we must overturn the public signifi-
cance of phallogocentric discourse. Alan Freeman offers a brilliant deconstruction of this
dominant discourse in Freeman & Schlegel, Sex, Power and Silliness, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 847,
858 (1985). Our practice of masturbation as moral terrorism must seek not to commodify
women, but to demonstrate the dialectical potentialities inherent in the practice of orgasmic
delight for its own value, a value which blatantly ignores and openly denies phallocentric econ-
omies of sexuality.
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